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ABSTRACT. Limited public funds for infrastructures have the government consider joining the 
private in a BOT project finance scheme. Generally, the BOT projects entail lots of managerial 
flexibilities that may induce the radical change of project’s cash flows, an asymmetric payoff, 
when facing on the uncertainties due to the BOT project finance’s unique characteristics. Among 
various managerial flexibilities in the BOT projects, the MRG (Minimum Revenue Guarantee) 
and the RCP (Revenue Cap) agreements are frequently used to protect the government and 
the developer from the operational risk. However, the combined effect of the MRG and RCP on 
the project value is not understood well because the traditional capital budgeting theory, the 
NPV (Net Present Value) analysis, is limited to assess the contingency of these agreements. 
So, the purpose of this paper is to develop the numerical model to assess the combined impact 
of the MRG and RCP agreements on the project value based on the option pricing theory and 
to suggest a theoretical framework. The approach applied in this paper is justified with the 
hypothetical BOT toll case and some meaningful conclusions are drawn from. The results by 
the option pricing concept are analyzed over those by NPV analysis and, finally, the combined 
value of the MRG and RCP agreements appears significant relative to the project value.
KEYWORDS: BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) project finance; Option pricing theory; MRG (Min-
imum Revenue Guarantee) agreement; RCP (Revenue Cap) agreement; Repeatedly-exercisable 
call-put compound option
1. INTRODUCTION
Limitation of public funds for infrastruc-
tures has had the government consider join-
ing the private developer in a BOT (Build-
Operate-Transfer) project finance scheme. 
The BOT scheme followed by the stakehold-
ers is regarded effective because it is based on 
the notion that the specific stakeholder will 
best treat with the specific risks involved in 
a project. The risk evolution that occurs in 
a BOT project is too complex for the project 
stakeholders to predict. Therefore, the govern-
ment and the developer have become closer to 
hedge the risks through comprehensive coop-
eration. The BOT project finance in various 
project finance schemes has worked well in a 
way to transfer the ownership from the private 
to the public upon the concession. The BOT 
project finance entails lots of unique character-
istics such as huge project size, long concession 
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period, or contractual complexity which can 
fall into two folds; “uncertainty” and “mana-
gerial flexibility”. Simply speaking, the “un-
certainty” stands for the uncertain change of 
the revenue (or cash flow) the project gener-
ates unlike what expected and the “manage-
rial flexibility” represents an event or reaction 
necessary to be exercised when the manage-
ment’s decision changes or predetermined 
agreements meet specific conditions due to 
unpredictable uncertainty during the project. 
The combined effect of both of “uncertainty” 
and “managerial flexibility” may generate an 
asymmetric payoff condition called “contingent 
claim” where the project’s revenue drasti-
cally shift and the fact one of the most popu-
lar capital budgeting theories, the NPV (Net 
Present Value) analysis, is limited to assess 
the value change caused by these asymmetric 
payoffs makes people seek alternations to re-
solve this issue. Among various asymmetric 
payoffs take place in a BOT project, the MRG 
(Minimum Revenue Guarantee) and RCP 
(Revenue Cap) agreements are regarded as 
the most representative “risk-reward” concept 
by being complementary applied in a BOT 
project (Cheah and Liu, 2006; Jun, 2008). The 
MRG agreement as a kind of incentive system 
is used to address the concerns of the private 
sector and to attract investor’s participation in 
financing the project while RCP agreement is 
applied to protect the government from the de-
veloper’s revenue exploitation in a BOT project. 
Although the MRG and RCP agreements 
are often chosen in BOT projects by both of 
the government and the BOT developer, the 
financial impact of these agreements are not 
well identified because the NPV analysis is 
not proper to evaluate these contingent claims 
(Cheah and Liu, 2006; Jun, 2008). However, it 
is fortune to have an effective alternation, the 
option pricing theory, in assessing the com-
plexly combined asymmetric payoffs in real 
assets (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999; Insley 
and Wirjanto, 2006). Similarities in evaluating 
process between the real assets and the finan-
cial derivatives can make possible to use the 
option pricing theory to evaluate the contin-
gencies of the MRG and RCP agreements in a 
BOT project (Mello and Pyo, 2003; Miller and 
Park, 2002). So, the purpose of this paper is to 
suggest a theoretical and practical process to 
evaluate the combined financial value of the 
MRG and RCP agreements in a BOT project 
through a numerically-developed option pric-
ing framework. To justify the applicability of 
the approach, the hypothetical BOT toll case 
is used and the results based on the model are 
scrutinized over those by the traditional capi-
tal budgeting theories.
2. THEORIES
2.1. Traditional capital budgeting 
theory: NPV analysis
The NPV analysis works well while opera-
tions are sure to generate relatively stable 
cash flows (Luehrman, 1997; Myers, 1984). 
Once risk is recognized in investment analysis 
based on the NPV method, the NPV analysis 
reflects risk through a risk-adjusted discount 
rate to discount the expected cash flows. In a 
real world, many firms classify different risk 
categories of projects and assign each catego-
ry different rates to reflect the risk involved 
(Trigeorgis, 1999) or use different discount 
rates in different periods to reflect the change 
of nominal rates of interest (Aggarwal, 1993). 
Although the NPV analysis has been widely 
agreed on in various industries effective, there 
are also some critics as follows. First, the NPV 
analysis assumes that the cash outflow is sta-
ble. Even when there are cash outflows in dif-
ferent time periods other than time ‘0’, they 
are assumed to have the same risk charac-
teristic as the cash inflows. However, in such 
real assets as real estate and infrastructure 
projects although the future cash inflows are 
assumed to be certain, the uncertainty mainly 
comes from the cash outflows. Second, when 
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the NPV analysis is applied to real assets, it 
can not adequately evaluate managerial flex-
ibilities to adjust later decision when, as un-
certainty is resolved, future events turn out 
differently from what management expected 
(Copeland and Antikarov, 2001; Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1995; Trigeorgis, 1999). Under high 
uncertainty, if an investment is planned with 
a staged decision-making or early investment 
reveals new information as to the future profit 
of the project, it deserves to invest even when 
NPV is negative (Amram and Kulatilaka, 
1999; Trigeorgis, 1999; Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994; Myers, 1984). As mistakenly ignoring 
the operating and managerial flexibilities in-
volved in a project can cause a significant un-
derestimation of its value, in the evaluation of 
long-term projects where future profitability is 
uncertain, it is critical to consider the associ-
ated managerial or strategic options (Mason 
and Merton, 1985). For the reasons above, the 
option pricing theory is suggested by some re-
searchers as an effective method to assess the 
contingencies occurring in real assets incor-
porating the managerial flexibilities into the 
project value. Equation (1) describes the basic 
form of the NPV analysis in a way of discount-
ing the future cash flows at a required rate of 
return (Brigham and Houston, 2004):








1/( )  (1)
where: I0 is the initial investment; FCFi is the 
future net cash flow after tax at time (or year) 
i; WACC (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) 
is the required rate of return used to discount 
the future cash flow FCFi, and i is the time 
increment. 
WACC of the firm or project are defined as 
shown in Equation (2).
WACC R E A R D A Te d= + −( / ) ( / )( )1  (2)
where: E is the equity; Re is the cost of eq-
uity; A is total invested capital; Rd is the cost 
of debt; D is the debt, and T is the corporate 
tax. 
As for the infrastructure projects, WACC 
determined based on Equation (2) is used in 
Equation (1) to find net present value of the 
project. WACC stands for a company’s weight-
ed average cost of capital reflecting cost of debt 
and cost of equity, and it is employed to evalu-
ate projects matching a firm’s existing opera-
tional assets and associated risks (Sharpe, 
1964). Thus, determining Rd, T, D, E and A is 
not difficult, and the last variable, cost of equi-
ty, Re, can be often estimated by CAPM (Capi-
tal Asset Pricing Model). Re is a measurement 
of the appropriate required return that equity 
investors expect on equity investments, given 
the level of risk of such investments. Equation 
(3) used to estimate Re is based on the CAPM 
developed by Sharpe (1964). When it comes to 
the infrastructure projects, since some risk pre-
miums coming from the uncertainties involved 
in the projects such as country or sector risk 
should be added to the cost of equity, actual 
risk-adjusted discount rate used in investment 
analysis can be greater than Re.
Re = Rf + βe (Rm − Rf) (3)
2.2. Option pricing theory
The option pricing theory developed by 
Black and Scholes (1973), and Merton (1973), 
for pricing financial derivatives is the build-
ing block of this paper. The concept of option 
pricing theory in finance is imported to seek 
to value managerial flexibilities on real assets 
or properties. This theory is based on the as-
sumption that the stock price follows an un-
certain diffusion process of a log-normal dis-
tribution called a ‘Geometric Brownian Motio’ 
proven to appropriately model the price of an 
asymmetric payoff of financial securities (Lu-
enberger, 1998). The uncertainty of the value 
of real asset is reasonably reflected through 
this diffusion process (Brennan and Schwartz, 
J. Jun142
1984; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Equation (4) 
describes the diffusion process of Geometric 
Brownian motion process in a capital market:
dS/S = μ dt + σ dz (4)
where: S is the stock price; μ is the instanta-
neous rate of return; σ2 is the instantaneous 
variance of the rate of return, and dz is a ran-
dom increment to a standard Wiener process. 
In the option pricing theory, which falls into 
two folds; Black-Scholes model (continuous-
time approach) and Binomial model (discrete-
time approach), the value of a European call 
option can be obtained by solving the partial 
differential equation derived by Black and Sc-
holes (1973), subject to one terminal and two 
boundary conditions. This Black-Scholes equa-
tion is on the basis of the complex mathemati-
cal process and that is why the Black-Scholes 
equation is analytically limited in modeling 
and calculating the option. For this reason, it 
has been necessary to use a numerical solution 
such as the binomial model that this paper fol-
lows (Cox et al., 1979).
2.3. Applying option pricing theory  
into infrastructure projects
The option pricing concept has been 
considered in evaluating infrastructure 
projects. It is found crude oil price follows a 
mean-reverting process for a long time horizon 
and the managerial flexibilities contingent on 
oil price can be modeled with option pricing 
concept (Wey, 1993). Leviäkangas and Lähes-
maa (2002) suggested the option approach is a 
useful valuation tool for intelligent transport 
system investments. Garvin and Cheah 
(2004) and Ford et al. (2002) used a option 
pricing approach to quantify a deferment 
option in a toll road project and to value the 
design flexibility in an engineering project 
respectively. Wooldridge et al. (2002) evaluated 
the flexibility in toll road project considering 
the option pricing theory with a case of Dulles 
Greenway. Other works include Ho and Liu 
(2002) who adopted the option pricing approach 
to the value against equity in a BOT project 
by formulating a discrete-time model to reflect 
the stochastic processes of project value and 
construction cost under the condition of debt 
guarantee and negotiation option.
2.4. Asymmetric payoff condition:  
Call and Put option
Even if the NPV analysis is considered ap-
propriate to evaluate the project in light of be-
ing consistent with the firm’s objective to max-
imize the shareholders’ utilities, under the un-
certainty involved in an investment analysis, 
the discount rate used in this method needs to 
be fairly adjusted over the related risks based 
on the CAPM (Copeland and Weston, 1988). 
However, there is a problematic argument that 
the NPV analysis can not capture the charac-
teristic of the managerial flexibilities during 
the uncertain behavior of the project revenue. 
The managerial flexibilities provide specific 
kinds of asymmetric payoffs analogous to those 
of the derivatives in a financial market. There-
fore, the option pricing theory can be applied 
to price such complicated contingencies of the 
managerial flexibilities. Followings are exam-
ples of the asymmetric payoffs in financial call 
and put options (Hull and White, 1990).
Fcall (St, t) = Max [0, St − X] (5)
and
Fput (St, t) = Max [0, X − St] (6)
where: Fcall is call option value; Fput is put op-
tion value; St is stock price at time t, and X is 
exercise price.
2.5. Managerial flexibilities: asymmetric 
payoffs of MRG and RCP agreements
In a BOT project finance, the MRG and 
RCP agreements often used follow the risk-
reward concept where the higher risk requires 
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higher return. As for the MRG agreement, if 
the realized project revenue (or cash flow) is 
lower than initially projected, the government 
should provide the developer with revenue 
shortfall as already agreed. This agreement, 
which is called “MRG”, helps the government 
attract the developer or financial investors at 
the initial stage of financing. Conversely, if 
the project revenue is excessively surpassing 
the initially pre-determined level agreed on, in 
turn, the developer can enjoy the surplus way 
over it must deserve, the government should 
have a way to ask claim for excessive benefit 
so as to quit or mitigate averse situations of 
the revenue exploitation. This practice is called 
RCP agreement that stipulates the payment 
from the BOT developer to the government 
(Cheah and Liu, 2006). By nature, the exercise 
of both of the MRG and RCP agreements 
relies on the specific conditions of whether 
or not the projected project revenue is higher 
than the realized project revenue. Followings 
show possible asymmetric payoffs of these 
two agreements and the combined form of the 
MRG and RCP agreements, “MRC”.
– MRG agreement as a Put option
When it comes to the MRG agreement, it 
can be formulated based on the concept of fi-
nancial put option. The basic idea of the MRG 
agreement is that during concessionaire pe-
riod if the realized cash flow in each year i 
satisfies the projected cash flow level already 
signed in a contract by both of the public and 
the private, the government does not have to 
pay any MRG to the BOT developer. Other-
wise, the government should compensate for 
the revenue shortfall by paying the BOT devel-
oper. As an MRG value, the government’s obli-
gation to pay in each year i, SFi, would depend 
on the relative value between projected cash 
flow at year i, CFip, and realized cash flow at 
year i, CFir, as shown in Equation (7) (Cheah 
and Liu, 2006). Where, FCFe is free cash flow 
on equity at year i.
SFi = Max[Projected FCFe at Year i – 
Realized FCFe at Year i, 0] = Max[CFip – 
CFir, 0] (7)
Finally, we can find the MRG value as 
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where: MRG is the present value of the total 
MRG value during concession period at time 
“0”; Rf is the risk-free rate, and n is the years 
of the BOT concession period.
– RCP agreement as a Call option
The RCP agreement can be formulated in a 
form of financial call option described in Equa-
tion (9) (Cheah and Liu, 2006). The basic con-
cept that the RCP agreement entails is, dur-
ing the concession, if the realized cash flow in 
each year surpasses way over negotiated level 
of the projected cash flow signed in a contract 
the government can ask claim for the revenue 
surplus to the BOT developer.
RCFi = Max[Realized FCFe at Year i – 
Projected FCFe at Year i, 0] = Max[CFir – 
CFip, 0] (9)
where: RCFi is RCP value at year i; CFir is re-
alized cash flow at year i, and CFip is projected 
cash flow at year i. As an RCP value, the BOT 
developer’s obligation to pay at year i, RCFi, re-
lies on the relative value between realized cash 
flow at year i, CFir, and projected cash flow at 
year i, CFip. Finally, the total value of RCP 
agreement until the end of concession, year 
n, RCP can be obtained by summing up the 
discounted RCFi at risk free rate to time “0”. 
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When necessary to apply the MRG and 
RCP agreements in a BOT project, the way 
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to specify the level of the MRG and the RCP 
can be based on the IRR (Internal Rate of Re-
turn), revenue, or traffic volume. And, this 
level would be fixed through the negotiation 
process between the government and the BOT 
developer. 
3. MRC (MRG-RCP) COMPOUND 
OPTION PRICING APPROACH
This paper takes into account a develop-
ment of an option pricing framework based on 
the binomial model (Cox et al., 1979) which 
is intuitive to identify the complexly-combined 
contingent claims; the MRG and the RCP 
agreements. The option modeling process keeps 
following disciplines. First, the MRG and the 
RCP agreements are numerically combined 
and modeled as repeatedly-exercisable 
compound option, MRC (MRG-RCP) option, 
which can be decomposed to the call and put 
options along with the appropriate financial 
and mathematical process. Second, the impact 
of the MRC option value on the project value 
is considered at the level of equity to look 
at the project from the BOT developer and 
the government’s points of views. Third, the 
developing process of the MRC compound 
option model is limited to three-time step for 
space and mathematical complexity. Finally, 
the numerically-modeled MRC (MRG-RCP) 
option approach is tested to show enough ap-
plicability through the hypothetical case of the 
BOT toll system. Followings are the processes 
to build the MRC compound option model.
Sept 1. Underlying asset “BOT project 
value” and its dynamics 
The first procedure to model the MRC com-
pound option is to choose the underlying asset 
and its dynamics. The value change of the un-
derlying asset, the BOT project value, affects 
the MRC compound option value because the 
option value varies contingent on the underly-
ing asset over time (Trigeorgis, 1999). As the 
debt payment against the financial investors 
depends on the future cash flows as collateral 
in a project finance, the forecasted cash flow, 
which affects the project value, becomes a 
main source of the underlying asset, in turn, 
the uncertainty of the project value would be 
risky variable during the concession (Beidle-
man et al., 1990; Finnerty, 1996). Afterward, 
the project value is assumed to fluctuate over 
time, due to the dynamic change of market 
conditions until the end of the concession, with 
a specific diffusion process, so called “Geomet-
ric Brownian Motion” process in Equation (11) 
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
dV/V = μ dt + σ dz (11)
In Equation (11), V represents the market 
value of a completed BOT project; μ is the mar-
ket required rate of return from the project; σ 
describes the volatility of the rate of return in 
the project value, and dz is an increment to 
a standard Wiener process. This notion helps 
easily assume a structure for the dynamics 
and uncertainties of the underlying risky as-
set ‘BOT project value’.
Figure 1. Binomial tree of underlying asset, V.
Step 2. Initial project value “VI”
To reflect the dynamics of the project value, 
it is necessary to have the initial project value 
identical to the discounted sum of the future 
cash flows but the initial investment cost, to 
the present with appropriate risk-adjusted dis-
count rate. If considers the BOT developer and 
the government’s points of views, the dynamics 
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of the project value on equity can be shown in 
Equation (12). 
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where: FCFei is the free cash flow on equity 
at year i and Re is the cost of equity. FCFei is 
obtained by deducting the annual debt service 
from the annual free cash flows.
Step 3. Volatility “σ”
Volatility, σ, defined as a standard devia-
tion of rate of return in cash flow return is a 
measurement of the ‘risk’ in finance and con-
sidered as an important factor to dominate 
the option value (Brigham and Houston, 2004; 
Hull, 1997). There exist some ways; Logarith-
mic cash flow return approach, Monte Carlo 
simulation, implied volatility, and so on, to 
find this value and, according to the extent 
required for each financial analysis; level of 
the accuracy or the convenience, the financial 
modeler chooses the method believed proper. 
Amongst various methodologies to find the 
volatility, because the logarithmic cash flow 
return approach is considered easy to be sim-
ply applied in a financial analysis, it is widely 
used in the valuation of real assets in many 
industries (Jun, 2008). The basic data used to 
calculate the volatility may be historic or fu-
ture estimates of cash flow returns agreed be-
tween the public and the private in a project. 
In the BOT case example in this paper, it is 
assumed that the volatility is given for space 
and the convenience of the calculation.
Step 4. Up and down movements & risk 
neutral probabilities
In the project value change over time, “up” 
and “down” movements, u and d, which are 
multiplied with the initial project value VI to 
reflect the uncertain behavior of the project 
value, are obtained from Equation (13) and (14) 
with σ. By imposing u = 1/d for convenience, 
the up and down movements “u” and “d” and 
risk neutral probabilities “q” and “1 – q” can be 
obtained from Equation (15) to (16) (Cox et al., 
1979). When we say n is number of times that 
one period of time is divided and ∆t is time 
interval, n multiplied by ∆t equals to 1.
][ tExpu Δ= σ  (13)
and
][ tExpd Δ−= σ  (14)
q = R − d / u − d (15)
and
1− q = u − R / u − d (16)
where: u and d are up and down movement 
multipliers of project value respectively and R 
is multiplier of risk-free rate, while continuous 
time approach. 
However, it can be considered to obtain u 
and d under the assumptions that the risk-
neutral probabilities q and 1 – q are equal to 
0.5 for the convenience of the calculation (Hull, 
1997). By keeping the risk-neutral probabili-
ties stable, it becomes trivial whether the bino-
mial tree is huge and the calculation is heavy 
regardless of the number of time step (Hull, 
1997). Equation (17) and (18) are the replace-
ments of Equation (13) and (14) while q and 
1 − q equal to 0.5.
u Exp r t t= − Δ + Δ⎡⎣
⎤
⎦( ( ) )1 2
2σ σ  (17)
and
d Exp r t t= − Δ − Δ⎡⎣
⎤
⎦( ( ) )1 2
2σ σ  (18)
The financial implication of risk-neutral 
probabilities is that the world where the 
project is being implemented is risk-neutral 
so that the financial modeler does not have to 
waste their time to find any arbitrary risk-ad-
justed discount rate (Jun, 2008). The notion of 
this “risk-neutral world” that the option pric-
ing theory is based on in financial economics 
is tremendously helpful while the use of the 
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financial engineering technique in evaluat-
ing complex financial products such as option, 
future, derivatives (Copeland and Antikarov, 
2001).
Step 5. Binomial tree with an underly-
ing asset “VI”
This is time to build a binomial tree, with 
parameters taken from above steps, which 
stands for all likely project values under the 
uncertainty. As shown in Figure 1, since the 
binomial tree reflects all the likely project 
values considering the uncertainty over time, 
the project values shown in the binomial 
tree represents the realized project values. 
Equation (19) to (27) are the realized project 
values in detail.
At t =1
V uV Exp r tu I= = ⋅ − Δ +⎡⎣1 1 2
2(( ( ) )σ
t VIΔ ⎤⎦)σ  (19)
V dV Exp r td I= = ⋅ − Δ −⎡⎣1 1 2
2(( ( ) )σ
t VIΔ ⎤⎦)σ  (20)
At t = 2
V u V Exp ruu I= = ⋅ −⎡⎣2 1 2
2 2(( ( ) )σ ·
t t VIΔ + Δ ⎤⎦)σ  (21)
V udV Exp r tud I= = ⋅ − +⎡⎣1 1 2
2(( ( ) )σ Δ
t r t tΔ + ⋅ − Δ − Δ ⎤⎦1 1 2
2) (( ( / ) ) )σ σ σ VI  (22)
V d V Exp r tdd I= = ⋅ − Δ −⎡⎣
2 22 1 2(( ( ) )σ  
t VIΔ ⎤⎦)σ  (23)
At t = 3
V u V Exp r tuuu I= = ⋅ − Δ +⎡⎣3 1 2
3 2(( ( ) )σ
t VIΔ ⎤⎦)σ  (24)
V u dV Exp r tuud I= = ⋅ − Δ +⎡⎣
2 22 1 2(( ( ) )σ
t r t tΔ + ⋅ − Δ − Δ ⎤21 1 2) (( ( ) ) )σ σ σ ⎦VI
 (25)
V d uV Exp r tddu I= = ⋅ − Δ −⎡⎣
2 22 1 2(( ( ) )σ
t r t tΔ + ⋅ − Δ + Δ ⎤21 1 2) (( ( ) ) )σ σ σ ⎦VI  (26)
V d V Exp r tddd I= = ⋅ − Δ −⎡⎣
3 23 1 2(( ( ) )σ
t VIΔ ⎤⎦)σ  (27)
Step 6. Option formulation
Firstly, the MRG agreement can be 
considered to be formulated as a repeatedly 
exercisable put option based on the asymmet-
ric payoff condition in Equation (7). However, 
this paper takes into account the option pricing 
frame at the level of project value as shown in 
Equation (28) because the volatility we need 
based on the project value is not exactly iden-
tical to that by the cash flow. If the realized 
project value at each time step is higher than 
the projected project value, there is no reason 
for the government to pay the MRG to devel-
oper. On the other hand, if the realized project 
value is less than the projected project value, 
there should be an MRG for the developers to 
quit an averse condition where they can not 
obtain the minimum revenue to cover the cost, 
expense, or debt.
MRGi = Max[Projected Project Value on 
Equity at Year i – Realized Project Value 
on Equity at Year i, 0] (28)
Conversely, to numerically formulate the 
RCP agreement, the concept of the repeatedly 
exercisable call option in Equation (29) is taken 
into account. Like in the formulation of the 
MRG agreement, the RCP agreement is mod-
eled at the level of project value as well. The 
asymmetric payoff generated from the RCP 
agreement during the concession is as below. 
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RCPi = Max[Realized Project Value on 
Equity at Year i – Projected Project Value 
on Equity at Year i, 0] (29)
where: RCPi is the RCP value at year i.
Finally, because the MRC compound option 
needs to reflect the characteristics of both of 
the MRG and the RCP agreements, the MRC 
option is modeled by combining the Equation 
(28) and (29). So, Equation (30) is the final 
form of the asymmetric payoff in the MRC 
compound option. MRCi represents the MRC 
value at year i and this option is repeatedly 
exercisable call-put compound option.
MRCi = Max[Projected Project Value on 
Equity at Year i – Realized Project Value 
on Equity at Year i, Realized Project Value
on Equity at Year i – Projected Project 
Value on Equity at Year i, 0] (30)
As for the exercise price, recall that the 
project value change in the option pricing 
theory follows a geometric Brownian motion 
process contingent on two major factors: the 
term of the stable rate of return which ex-
cludes the possibility of uncertain price be-
havior and that of the uncertain rate of re-
turn which follows random selection process 
during the operation (Hull and White, 1990). 
Here, the varying project value with the sta-
ble rate of return is assumed as a realized 
project value “exercise price” as described in 
Equation (31). Xn represents an exercise price 
at time t.
At t n=
X Exp n r t Vn I= ⋅ −⎡⎣
⎤
⎦( ( ) )1 2
2σ Δ  (31)
Step 7. Asymmetric payoff condition at 
each node in the binomial tree
Throughout the above steps, we finally can 
construct the asymmetric payoff conditions in a 
form of the binomial tree for each time step as 
shown in Figure 2. As for the asymmetric payoffs 
for all node of the binomial tree, MRCu and 
MRCd , at t = 1, are Max[X1 − Vu, Vu − X1, 0] and 
Max[X1 − Vd, Vd − X1, 0] respectively. At t = 2, 
MRCuu, MRCud, and MRCdd are Max[X2 − 
Vuu, Vuu − X2, 0], Max[X2 − Vud, Vud − X2, 0], 
and Max[X2 − Vdd, Vdd − X2, 0] respectively. 
At t = 3, MRCuuu, MRCuud, MRCddu, and 
MRCddd are Max[X3 − Vuuu, Vuuu − X3, 0], 
Max[X3 − Vuud, Vuud − X3, 0], Max[X3 − Vddu, 
Vddu - X3, 0], and Max[X3 − Vddd, Vddd − X3, 0] 
respectively.
Figure 2. Asymmetric payoff of the MRC 
compound option in binomial tree.
Step 8. MRC compound option value 
calculation
As the final step of modeling the MRC 
compound option, the calculation of option 
value begins from the back of the binomial 
tree recursively in Figure 2. The selected op-
tion value based on the asymmetric payoff con-
dition at every node can be calculated with the 
parameters of q, 1 – q, and R. For instance, 
while finding the option value MRCuu at node 
“uu” in Figure 2, we can expect two events of 
whether an MRC compound option is exercised 
or not as below in Equation (32) which shows 
two likely events at node “uu”.
(32)
MRC
Not Exercised q Max X V V X q Max X V
uu
uuu uuu uud: [ , , ] ( ) [3 3 30 1− − + − − , , ] [ ]
: [ , , ]
V X Exp r t
















Afterward, as we should selectively choose 
the maximized option value at every node 
under the assumption that the reasonable in-
vestors do their best to maximize profits, the 
larger option value regardless of option’s exer-
cise will be selected (Copeland and Antikarov, 
2001; Jun, 2008). Hence, the only one chosen 
between two option values whichever is larger 
is the very option value at node “uu”. Equation 
(33) describes the MRC value at node “uu”.
MRC Max q Max X Vuu uuu= −[ ,3⎡⎣⎡⎣
V X q Max X Vuuu uud− + − −, ] ( ) [ ,3 30 1
V Xuud − ,3 0 ] [ ],⎤⎦ Exp r tΔ
02 2[ , , ]− − ⎤⎦Max X V V Xuu uu  (33)
Equation (34) to (39) describes all likely 
MRC option values at all nodes in the three-
step binomial tree and, through the iterations 
of this process at every node for all time steps, 
the MRC value at time “0”, which finally we 
want to have, can be calculated (the MRC 
values of MRCuuu, MRCuud, MRCddu, and 
MRCddd at t = 3, are Max[X3 − Vuuu, Vuuu − 
X3, 0], Max[X3 − Vuud, Vuud − X3, 0], Max[X3 − 
Vddu, Vddu – X3, 0], and Max[X3 − Vddd, Vddd – 
X3, 0] respectively because this is the final 
time step).
At t = 2
MRC Max qMRCuu uuu= +⎡⎣⎡⎣
q MRC Exp r t Max X Vuud uu− ⎤⎦ −1 2( ) / [ ], [ ,Δ
V Xuu − ⎤⎦2 0, ]  (34)
MRC Max qMRCud udu= +⎡⎣⎡⎣
q MRC Exp r t Max X Vudd ud− ⎤⎦ −( ) [ ], [ ,1 2Δ
V Xud − 2, ]0 ⎤⎦  (35)
MRC Max qMRCdd ddu= +⎡⎣⎡⎣
q MRC Exp r t Max X Vddd dd− ⎤⎦ −( ) [ ], [ ,1 2Δ
V Xdd − 2, ]0 ⎤⎦  (36)
At t =1
MRC Max qMRC q MRCu uu ud= + −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦1( )⎡⎣
Exp r t Max X V V Xu u− −1 1[ ], [ ,Δ , ]0 ⎤⎦  (37)
MRC Max qMRC q MRCd du dd= + −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦⎡⎣ ( )1
Exp r t Max X V V Xd d− −[ ], [ , , ]02 2Δ ⎤⎦  (38)
At t
MRC qMRC q MRC Exp r tu d
=
= + −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ =
0
1( ) / [ ]Δ
Max qMax qMRC q Muu + −1( ) RCud⎡⎣ ⎤⎦⎡⎣ /⎡⎣
⎡
⎣
Exp r t X V V X qu u− − ⎤⎦ + −[ ], , , ( )Δ 1 1 0 1
·
Max qMRC q Mdu + −( )1 RC Exp r tdd / [ ] ,Δ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦⎡⎣
X V V X Exp r td d, , [ ]Δ− − ⎤⎦⎤⎦
⎤
⎦1 1 0  (39)
4. HYPOTHETICAL BOT CASE STUDY
This chapter is to apply the MRC compound 
option pricing framework into the hypothetical 
case of the BOT toll road, which is simplified 
version of a real project, to show the applica-
bility of the approach. Table 1 describes the 
basic data and information of the BOT case 
example where the capital expenditure, oper-
ating expenditure, and average toll rate are 
assumed to increase at annual level of 3%. The 
initial traffic volume and the traffic volume 
growth rate are assumed to follow log-normal 
and normal distributions respectively (Cheah 
and Liu, 2006). Table 2 describes the expected 
cash flow model given data and information 
in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Hypothetical BOT toll road case
Capital structure ($: Dollars, M: Million)
Project construction cost $143.47 M (3 years) Average toll rate $ 1.87
Debt : Equity = 71.8:28.2 $103.01 M : $ 40.46 M Concession period 30 years (from 2005)
Debt Senior: 13 years (7.25 %) MRG agreement 90% of expected revenue (30 years)
Capital expenditure $2.61 M (every 5 years) RCP agreement 110% of expected revenue (30 years)
Operating expenditure $2.59 M (every year) Market rate of return 10.4%
Corporate tax rate 27.5% Risk free rate 5.3%
Initial traffic volume/
Volatility 7.153 / 1.94 M  (year) Cost of equity 12.848%
Traffic volume growth rate/ 
Volatility 2.34 / 0.79 % Volatility 0.083
Table 2. Expected cash flow of hypothetical BOT toll road case ($: Dollar, M: Million)
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 … … … 2032 2033 2034
Traffic volume (M) – – – 7.153 7.398 … … … 13.381 13.668 13.962
Toll rate ($) – – – 1.87 1.93 … … … 4.16 4.29 4.42 
Gross revenue (M, $) – – – 13.40 14.28 … … … 55.69 58.59 61.65 
CAPEX (M, $) 40.46 – – … … … 5.96 
OPEX (M, $) – – – 2.50 2.58 … … … 5.55 5.72 5.89 
EBIT (M, $) –40.46 – – 10.90 11.70 … … … 50.14 52.87 49.80 
Debt service (M, $) – – – … … …
Taxes (M, $) – – – 3.00 3.22 … … … 13.79 14.54 13.69 
FCF on equity (M, $) –40.46 – – 7.90 8.48 … … … 36.35 38.33 36.10 
4.1. NPV analysis
With market risk premium, Rm − Rf of 
5.1%, βe of 1.48 which is the weighted aver-
age of the equity investors’ β, and the given 
data shown in Table 1, we finally find NPVe 
equal to $2.02 million without considering 
the impact of the MRG and RCP agreements. 
Equation (40) and (41) show how re and NPVe 
are obtained.
R R R Re f m f e= + − = +( ) . %β 5 3
× =( . . ) . %5 1 1 48 12 848  (40)
NPVe = − + +40 46 1 1285 0 0 1 1285
0 1. / ( . ) . / ( . )
+ +0 0 1 1285 38 32. / ( . ) ... . 3 1 1285 31/ ( . ) +
36 10 1 1285 2 0232. / ( . ) $ .= Million  (41)
4.2. Option pricing analysis
We can obtain some calculated parameters 
of VI, σ, u, d, q, and 1-q, based on the steps 
described earlier, necessary to be ready for the 
option pricing approach and building a bino-
mial tree to render all the likely project values 
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supposed to happen during the concession. The 
initial project value VI is as Equation (42).




= + = +
=
∑ / ( ) . / ( . )1 7 90 1 1285
1
1
+ +. / ( . ) ...8 48 1 1285 382 . / ( . )33 1 1285 29 +
. / ( . ) $ .36 10 1 1285 54 1030 = Million  (42)
Given that the volatility of the project value 
is 0.083 in Table 1, we can calculate the up 
and down movements of u and d. When ∆t and 
n equal to 1, u is obtained by Exp[(0.053 − (1/2)
(0.083)2)× 1 + (0.083 1)]. Then the result is 
1.142. d also can be obtained by the formula 
of Exp[(0.053 − (1/2)(0.083)2)×1 − (0.083 1)]. 
Finally, d is 0.967. As for the exercise price, 
X, dependent on the projected project value, 
since the projected project value at time ‘0’ 
is the same as the initial project value mul-
tiplied by 1.1 according to the agreement the 
revenue surplus which is way over 110% of the 
expected cash flow will be paid back to the gov-
ernment, the initial exercise price is 1.1×54.10 
identical to 59.51 at the first year of the opera-
tion. Afterward, this value increases at annual 
rate of r − (1/2)σ2 = 0.053 − (1/2)0.0832 = 0.05 
over time from second year of the concession. 
The MRC value is obtained from backward re-
cursive calculation process by being discounted 
at risk-free rate with the consideration of risk 
neutral probabilities regardless of whether or 
not the option is exercised at every node in the 
binomial tree. As a result, the calculation gives 
us the MRC value, in 2007, $19.50 million as 
described in Table 3.
5. RESULTS
The MRC value in 2002 is $17.54 million, 
by discounting the MRC value in 2004, $19.50 
million, at risk-free rate. This accounts for 
868% of NPVe, $2.02 million, and 43.85% of 
the equity investment, $40 million, respec-
tively. The result shows the combined effect of 
the MRG and RCP agreements can not be ig-
nored because of its huge impact on the project 
value. Figure 3 and 4 and Table 4 describe the 
sensitivity of the MRC value to the change of 
the volatilities of two revenue components. The 
result renders while the MRC value relies on 
the volatility of the initial traffic volume, the 
volatility of the traffic volume growth rate does 
not seem to impact on the MRC value. This 
implies that for the government and the BOT 
developer to reasonably decide the MRG and 
RCP levels during the bidding process, they 
have to more focus on predicting the proba-
bility distribution of the initial traffic volume 
rather than that of the traffic volume growth 
rate. Another needs to be better emphasized 
is the MRC value against the volatility of the 
project value (underlying asset) behaves the 
same way as the financial option where the op-
tion value increases while the volatility of the 
underlying asset grows. As for the effect of the 
MRG level on the project MRC value, it turns 
out the increase of the MRG level increases 
the MRC value in Figure 5. Conversely, the 
increasing revenue ceiling seems to reduce the 
MRC value as the probability of the threshold 
to exercise the RCP option becomes lower in 
Figure 6. Therefore, the BOT developer tends 
to make the MRG and RCP levels stay higher 
while the government must run counter by 
lowering the MRG and RCP levels not to be 
exploited in the project revenue. Here, as the 
projected project value used as an exercise 
price is the only controllable factor on which 
the MRG and RCP levels depend, the process 
to decide these thresholds should be also care-
fully dealt with. Finally, the wise use of the 
information captured by this model can help 
both of the government and the BOT developer 
put themselves in an advantageous position in 
their bidding process.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4. “Volatility of project value” and “MRC value” against the volatility of revenue components
MRC value 
(Volatility of project value)
Volatility of traffic volume growth rate (σGR)
0.40 0.79 1.19 1.58
Volatility of initial traffic 
volume (σTV)
0.97 8.16(0.042) 7.94(0.041) 7.94(0.041) 7.94(0.041)
1.94 16.81(0.080) 17.54(0.083) 16.81(0.080) 17.05(0.081)
2.91 25.80(0.117) 25.80(0.117) 26.05(0.118) 25.80(0.117)
3.88 34.24(0.152) 33.76(0.150) 34.24(0.152) 34.24(0.152)
Figure 3. Sensitivity of the MRC value to 
volatility of initial traffic volume (σGR: 0.79).
Figure 4. Sensitivity of the MRC value to 











Revenue Cap Level (% of Expected Revenue)
Figure 5. MRC value over MRG level (RCP: 90%).











Figure 6. MRC value over revenue cap level 
(MRG: 110%).
6. CONCLUSIONS
The MRG and RCP agreements are impor-
tant concerns for both of the BOT developer 
and the government during the BOT project 
because the use of these two agreements are 
often simultaneously selected in a bidding 
process to hedge the risks due to the opera-
tional risk in light of the risk-reward concept 
and have been known to impact on the finan-
cial feasibility of the project. However, the 
applications of the MRG and RCP agreements 
produce kind of complex contingencies to make 
difficult to assess the project value with the 
NPV analysis. So, the option pricing framework 
to evaluate the MRC compound option 
combined with the MRG and RCP agreements 
is modeled in this paper and, at last, following 
meaningful conclusions are drawn from. First, 
the MRC option value appears to significantly 
impact on the net present value on equity and 
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the initial equity investment in the BOT toll 
case. Therefore, appropriately agreed MRG 
and RCP levels in a BOT project play an 
important role for both of the BOT developer 
and the government to feel comfortable under 
the operational uncertainty should things go 
wrong. Second, in a bidding process, the gov-
ernment may seek to lower the MRG and RCP 
levels while the BOT developer may do quite 
the opposite within agreeable range. Howev-
er, the level of the RCP and MRG agreements 
should be fairly balanced with the notion that 
the reward needs to correspond to the risk 
level involved. So, the option pricing approach 
can be an efficient alternation to suggest the 
fairly quantified the MRG and RCP agreement 
levels. Third, the option approach formulated 
in this paper seems relatively easy to use in a 
real BOT project rather than the Black-Scholes 
model because its derivation comes from sim-
ple algebra. In addition, the way to formulate 
the MRC compound option may be applied to 
assess other complex managerial flexibilities 
in a BOT project through the adequate modi-
fication process. However, in this paper there 
are still some open issues that mainly arise 
from the characteristics of the BOT project 
or the option pricing theory. Therefore, it is 
supposed to further investigations concerning 
the followings. First, the only reasonable fi-
nancial modeling for a BOT project can jus-
tify the credibility of the MRC option value. 
Whatever the purpose is, if the project revenue 
is intentionally distorted, the option value may 
go far beyond the reasonable range, in turn, 
change the result of the negotiation. So, fur-
ther empirical studies are essential to improve 
the fundamental of the option pricing frame 
in the BOT project world. Second, for both 
of the government and the BOT developer to 
identify the admissible levels of the MRG and 
RCP agreements considering the risk-reward 
concept, it needs to investigate how balanced 
the RCP (or MRG) value is with that of the 
MRG (or RCP) by matching two agreement 
values. Even though this process seems to 
require further research to separately model 
and evaluate the MRG and RCP agreements, 
it can help understand the additive impact of 
the MRC compound option, which is mixed 
with the MRG and RCP agreements, on the 
project value relative to the separate impact 
of the MRG and the RCP options. And, it is no 
doubt that this process is meaningful for the 
government and the BOT developer to build 
strategic bidding plans. At last, in a real world, 
since there are more various and complicated 
managerial flexibilities able to be formed as 
asymmetric payoffs, effort to identify, formu-
late, and evaluate these contingencies is more 
required.
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SANTRAUKA
MIŠRIŲ SUSITARIMŲ DĖL SVP PROJEKTŲ FINANSAVIMO ĮVERTINIMAS: PAGAL 
MINIMALIAS PAJAMŲ GARANTIJAS IR PAJAMŲ KAPITALIZACIJOS SUSITARIMUS
Jaebum JUN
Dėl ribotų viešojo sektoriaus lėšų vyriausybė nusprendė sujungti privačias lėšas pagal SVP (angl. BOT) 
projektų finansavimo schemą. Paprastai SVP projektai yra lanksčiai valdomi, todėl gali sukelti radikalių po-
kyčių grynuosiuose projekto pinigų srautuose asimetrinį atsipirkimą dėl unikalių SVP projektų finansavimo 
savybių. Tarp įvairių lanksčių SVP projektų valdymo pavyzdžių minėtini minimalios pajamų garantijos (angl. 
MRG) ir pajamų kapitalizacijos (angl. RCP) susitarimai. Jie dažnai naudojami siekiant apsaugoti valdžią ir 
vystytoją nuo veiklos rizikos. Tačiau bendras minimalių pajamų garantijų ir pajamų kapitalizacijos susita-
rimų poveikis projekto vertei nesuprantamas ir dėl to, kad tradicinė kapitalo teorija, grynosios dabartinės 
vertės (angl. NPV) analizė yra ribotos vertinant nenumatytus šių susitarimų atvejus. Taigi šio straipsnio 
tikslas – plėtoti skaitmeninį modelį, įvertinti bendrą minėtų susitarimų poveikį projekto vertei, pagrįstai 
pasirinkto sandorio įkainojimo teorija, ir pasiūlyti teorinį pagrindimą. Šiame straipsnyje taikomas metodas 
pagrįstas hipotetiniais SVP rinkliavos atvejais ir kai kuriomis padarytomis išvadomis. Pasirinkto sandorio 
įkainojimo samprata analizuojama atliekant grynosios dabartinės vertės analizę, kol bendra minimalių pa-
jamų garantijų ir pajamų kapitalizacijos susitarimų vertė tampa labai svarbi, palyginti su projekto verte.
